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Abstract
In the infinite horizon alternating price setting duopoly of Maskin and Tirole (1988), a
focal price equilibrium and an equilibrium consisting of Edgeworth cycles coexist. In
this study we investigate which of these two equilibria is more likely to emerge by means
of a laboratory experiment. In 20 out of 27 observations the focal price equilibrium
emerges, while price cycles are observed in only one observation. Furthermore, we study
the duopoly in case of a long but finite horizon. Although the corresponding unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of Edgeworth cycles, experimentally we still observe
a focal price in the majority of the observations. Nevertheless, price cycles are observed
far more often than for the infinite horizon setting.
JEL Classification Codes: C91, D43.
Keywords: Alternating move, price setting, experiment, price cycles.
1 Introduction
In oligopolistic markets, prices often fluctuate even though demand and supply conditions are
stable. Frequently, the rocket-feather pricing pattern is observed, where a series of small price
decrements is followed by a sudden substantial increment, after which prices start declining
again, possibly after a period of stable prices. Empirical studies have found such a pattern for
local gasoline markets in the United States (Castanias and Johnson, 1993, and Doyle et al.,
2007), Canada (Eckert, 2003, and Noel, 2007), and Australia (Wang, 2005). Similarly, a price
pattern consisting of periods of stability followed by gradual undercutting of competitors’
prices has been observed for the airline industry (Ross, 1997, and Busse, 2002).
The traditional price setting model for an oligopolistic market was introduced by Bertrand
(1883). For homogeneous objects this model predicts that, in equilibrium, prices equal
marginal cost. Consequently, prices are stable and firms do not make any profit. Edgeworth
(1925) showed that, in contrast to the static price equilibrium of Bertrand, prices do cycle
∗We thank conference participants in Alicante (IMEBE 2008) for helpful comments and suggestions.
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when firms face capacity constraints and set prices repeatedly. In this so-called Edgeworth
cycle, firms successively undercut each others’ prices until the ‘war’ becomes too expensive
and one firm increases its price. Next, the other firms respond with a match or a slight
undercut, after which the process of undercutting resumes. This result, however, is induced
by the competitors’ mutual irrational expectation that opponents maintain their prices from
the previous period.
In opposition, Chamberlain (1933) claims that a small number of firms will not start un-
dercutting but rather charge the monopoly price. The firms will realize their interdependence
and that competitors will retaliate a price cut by also cutting their prices. Therefore, the
result of a price cut will be a decrease in its own profits. Hall and Hitch (1939) and Sweezy
(1939) formalize this conjecture by showing that a focal price equilibrium can be sustained
for a kinked demand curve.
Maskin and Tirole (1988) show that the equilibria envisioned by Edgeworth and Chamber-
lain can coexist for an infinite time horizon. They show that when firms face short-run price
commitments, which is modeled via alternating price setting, both a focal price equilibrium
and an equilibrium consisting of Edgeworth cycles emerge as a Markov perfect equilibrium. In
the focal price equilibrium, prices are stable at the monopoly price. In the Edgeworth cycles
equilibrium, prices decline gradually to marginal cost after which one of the firms raises the
price again and the undercutting resumes.
A different line of theoretical explanations for periods of stable prices and periods of
successive undercutting concerns tacit collusion. Price wars can erupt due to uncertainty
related to the market conditions. Green and Porter (1984) consider a model in which firms
face uncertainty about current demand such that price cutting detection is hindered. Optimal
punishment is not to resort to the Bertrand equilibrium forever but involves a finite number of
periods after which a collusive price is again adopted. Furthermore, Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986) show that collusive prices move countercyclically in case market demand is stochastic.
Evidence of price cycles in experiments is rather limited. Cason et al. (2005) find that for
some variations of the Edgeworth hypothesis, the data of repetitive posted price offers by six
sellers displays a cycle. Furthermore, Kruse et al. (1994) observe price cycles when capacity
is restricted and there are four players. Guillén (2004) finds price cycles for an experiment
involving simultaneous price and quantity setting. However, in the same setting, price cycles
are not observed in case of two or three sellers (Brandts and Guillén, 2003).
In this paper, by means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the potential to observe
price cycles in the alternating price setting of Maskin and Tirole (1988) with two players. We
consider the infinite and the finite time horizon versions of this model. For the infinite
time horizon there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium with stable prices besides a Markov
perfect equilibrium that displays price cycles. For the finite time horizon, the subgame-perfect
equilibrium induces a cyclical pricing pattern. Strikingly, the backwards induction strategies
do not converge to stationary behavior when the horizon lengthens. In our experiment, we
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find that in an infinite horizon setting, the focal price equilibrium emerges in 20 out of 27
observations and price cycles in only one observation. For the finite horizon setting, we also
observe the focal price outcome in the majority of the observations, even though it is not
predicted by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. However, we observe clear price cycles in
three and price wars in two out of the fifteen observations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic
model and the Markov perfect equilibria for the infinite time horizon of the model and the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in case the time horizon is finite. In Section 3, the experi-
mental design and procedures are described. The analysis of the data is presented in Section
4. The paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Setting
The setting that we consider is precisely the illustrating example of the exogenous-timing
duopoly model of Maskin and Tirole (1988). The two firms compete in a homogenous product
market with prices being the strategic variable. Firms interact dynamically in discrete time
and can adapt their prices alternately. So, in the periods in which a firm cannot adapt its
price, the price remains equal to the price set in the previous period. Consequently, firms set
prices for two periods. This alternating move structure captures the idea of short-run price
commitments. Without loss of generality, we assume that firm A can adapt its price in odd
periods and firm B in even periods.
The prices that firms can charge are the seven integers between (and including) 0 and
6. Given the firms prices at a certain period, pA and pB, the market price for that period
equals p∗ = min{pA; pB}. The market demand for that period is given by D(p∗) = 6−p∗. We
assume that the firms do not incur any costs for production. Consequently, the market profit
equals Π(p∗) = p∗ · D(p∗). Table 1 summarizes the possible market prices and the resulting
market demand and market profit. The products are homogeneous and therefore only the
Market price 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market demand 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Market profit 0 5 8 9 8 5 0
Table 1: The output and profit for the seller with the lowest price.
firm with the lowest price sells output. This means that if a firm has the unique lowest price,
this firm receives the full market profit. In case both firms charge the same price, the market
demand and the market profit are split equally among them.
Next, we consider this setting with an infinite and a finite time horizon.
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2.1 Infinite horizon
Suppose that the time horizon is infinite and future profits are discounted by a factor δ. It is
assumed that this discount factor is sufficiently close to, and strictly smaller than one. Firms
maximize the present value of the infinite stream of profits. Maskin and Tirole (1988) solve
this setting for strategies that only depend on the payoff relevant state, which is in this case
the price set by the other firm in the previous period. Consequently, strategies are dynamic
reaction functions that give a response price for each price set by the other firm. There are
two Markov perfect equilibria that coexist: a focal price equilibrium and an equilibrium that
consists of Edgeworth cycles.1
In the focal price equilibrium, the firms always set prices equal to 3 which is then also the
market price. Hence, the market demand and profit is split equally and each firm makes a
profit of 4.5 in all periods. The symmetric equilibrium strategy and the prices set along the
equilibrium path are shown in Figure 1.
Price Response price
6 3
5 3
4 3
3 3
2 1
1 1 with probability β(δ)
3 with probability 1− β(δ)
0 3
β(δ) ≡ (5 + δ)/(5δ + 9δ2)
Selected price
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time
-
• • • • • • • • • •◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Figure 1: Focal price equilibrium. Left panel: symmetric MPE strategy. Right panel: selected price
by the respective firm in the respective period (• = firm 1; ◦ = firm 2).
As soon as one of the two firms sets a price of 3, prices remain there ever after. From any
price above 3, the equilibrium response brings the price immediately down to 3. From prices
below 3, prices are not instantly changed to 3, but do end up there with probability one.
Bringing the price up from 1 to 3 is costly and therefore each firm prefers the other firm to
do so. The probability β(δ) is determined in such a way that the firm is indifferent between
raising and not raising the price.
The other Markov perfect equilibrium induces a cyclical pricing pattern on the equilibrium
path. The symmetric equilibrium strategy and the prices set along the equilibrium path are
shown in Figure 2. The firms undercut each other’s price successively until the price equals
zero and neither firm makes a positive profit. At that price, each firm has an incentive to
raise its price. Furthermore, each firm prefers the other firm to raise its price first, so that it
can start undercutting in the subsequent period. The probability α(δ) is determined in such
a way that the firm is indifferent between raising and not raising the price. After one firm
1For proofs see Maskin and Tirole (1988). They refer to the focal price equilibrium as a kinked demand
curve. For our experimental context it is more intuitive to interpret it as the focal price equilibrium.
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has raised the price, the undercutting starts again. The price cycles consist of two phases:
an undercutting phase and a coordination phase concerning which firm is going to raise the
price when the price equals zero. In equilibrium, all prices except 6 are observed.
Price Response price
6 4
5 4
4 3
3 2
2 1
1 0
0 0 with probability α(δ)
5 with probability 1− α(δ)
α(δ) ≡ (3δ2 − 1)(1 + δ2 + δ4)/(8 + 7δ2 + 2δ4 + 3δ6)
Selected price
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time
-
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦
Figure 2: Edgeworth cycle equilibrium. Left panel: symmetric MPE strategy. Right panel: selected
price by the respective firm in the respective period (• = firm 1; ◦ = firm 2).
2.2 Finite horizon
In this subsection, we consider a similar setting but then with a finite time horizon without
discounting. For a fixed horizon, the resulting game can be solved by application of the
backwards induction procedure. Obviously, the best response in the last period is to undercut
the opponent if possible. Considering the profit structure of the game, this still does not imply
that for long horizons prices constant at 1 are observed. It appears that when the horizon
lengthens, the backwards induction outcome converges to a pricing pattern that contains
recurrent cycles (as long as the final stage is not too near). The best responses within a cycle
not only depend on the current price of the opponent, but also on the number of periods that
have elapsed since the start of the cycle. The non-stationary pricing behavior within a cycle
is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Best responses for long finite horizons.
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The seven boxes represent periods 1 to 7 of a price cycle. In each box, an arrow shows the
best response for each current price of the opponent. The price that will be set along the
equilibrium path is shown in boldface in each box. In box 1, the best response is to set the
price equal to 1, regardless of the opponent’s current price. Note that the actual period in
time at which this behavior is observed is not specified, we take it as the first of the cycle
since the resulting price is 1 in any case. Next, in box 2, the price of 1 is responded with one
of the prices 4, 5 and 6. By overshooting the current market price, the opponent foregoes any
immediate profit in exchange for future profits. In box 3, no matter which of the three prices
were chosen in box 2, the response is to undercut this price by setting the price equal to 3.
Thereby the maximum immediate profit of 9 is gained. Consequently, in the previous box
the opponent is indeed indifferent between setting a price of 4, 5, or 6. Next, in box 4, the
opponent undercuts this price by setting its price equal to 2, and this price is again undercut
by a price of 1 in box 5. Then, the price remains at 1 in box 6, 7 and 1 in order to be brought
up in box 2 and subsequently to start the gradual undercutting.
Although the figure only presents seven boxes, the cycle has a length of fourteen periods.
Namely, if it is the one firm that played according to the action displayed in box 1, after
having reached box 7, it is the other firm that continues with the action that is depicted in
box 1. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the prices being selected over periods follows a cyclical
pattern with cycle length of seven. A graphical illustration of the cycle is given in Figure 4.
The figure does not contain prices observed in initial periods or periods close to the horizon.
Selected price
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time
-
•
•
• •
•
•
• •
•
• •
•
•
• •◦
◦
◦
◦ ◦
◦
◦ ◦
◦
◦
◦ ◦
◦
◦ ◦
Figure 4: Cyclical pattern of selected prices (• = firm 1; ◦ = firm 2).
3 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiment, we study subjects’ behavior in the alternating price setting model for the
infinite and the finite (but lengthy) time horizon. Our experimental design, hence, consists of
two treatments that are equal apart from the way the number of periods is determined. In the
first treatment we implemented a random continuation rule, whereas in the other treatment
we have a fixed number of periods.
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In the treatment with random ending, each period there was a two percent probability that
the experiment ended after that period. Of course, it requires a sufficiently long horizon in
order to be able to find mature behavior. In order to increase chances on having a session with
a sufficiently long horizon, we scheduled two sessions for this treatment. Within a session, all
subjects faced the same horizon. In the end, the experiment consisted of 67 periods in the
first session, and of 40 periods in the second session.2 In the treatment with fixed ending,
the experiment ended after 80 periods. In both treatments, subjects were perfectly informed
about the determination of the number of periods. The treatments are summarized in Table 2.
Random ending Fixed ending
Session 1 Session 2
Periods 67 40 80
Observations 15 12 15
Table 2: The experimental treatments.
At the beginning of the session, subjects were randomly matched in pairs and it was common
knowledge that the matching did not change throughout the experiment. Subjects, however,
never learned the identity of the subject they were matched with. Before the first period
started, for each matched pair of subjects, it had to be decided who of the two subjects can
adapt the price in the first (and hence each odd) period and what price was responded to
in this first period. Therefore, the experiment started with a pre-stage phase in which both
subjects simultaneously had to set an initial price. Next, it was randomly decided which of
the two subjects could adapt the price in the first period. In the first period, this subject
responded to the other’s price set in the pre-stage phase.3
Every period, the subjects that were able to adapt their prices could observe the current
period price of their opponent. Prices were selected by marking one of the seven possible
prices. At the end of each period, subjects received an overview of the results of that period,
which consisted of both prices, own profit, and own total profit so far. In periods where
subjects could not adapt their price, they only observed the result screen of that period.
The experiment was conducted in the behavioral and experimental laboratory (BeeLab) of
the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration at Maastricht University in November
2007. The laboratory has a capacity of 32 students and we allowed precisely 32 students to
register for each of the three sessions. The experiment was announced via email and subjects
could register online using their matriculation number, which ensured that students could
participate only once. When students arrived at the laboratory, they had to draw a card
from a deck that determined at which computer terminal they were placed. In case an odd
number of students showed up for a session, we included a blank card in the deck. Students
that drew the blank card could not participate and were paid e 3.- as compensation. In
2See Selten et al. (1997) and Dal Bó (2005) for discussions on approximating infinitely repeated games in
experiments.
3The pre-stage price of the subject that could adapt its price in the first period was never revealed.
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total, 84 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. Students not showing up or
cancelling on short notice led to the dispersion in the number of independent observations.
All interactions took place via computers that were connected to a network and the com-
puter terminals were placed in such a way that subjects could neither see the screens of
others nor make eye contact with them. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Before the start of a session, subjects read the
instructions and were allowed to privately ask questions that were then privately answered.
After reading the instructions, subjects had to answer control questions, which tested their
understanding of the instructions.4 One of the experimenters checked the answers, and the
experiment only started after all subjects answered each question correctly. During the ex-
periment, subjects earned ECU that were converted into Euros at a known exchange rate at
the end of the experiment. We used the same exchange rates in both treatments and 20 ECU
was exchanged for 1 Euro. The average payoff was e 17.78 including a show-up fee of e 5.-.
Sessions lasted, depending on the treatment, between 45 and 70 minutes. Payment took place
privately, and subjects had to leave the laboratory immediately after payment.
4 Results
In this section we analyze the experimental price setting behavior. For both treatments,
it is found that the major share of the groups coordinated on a price of 3 (the focal point
equilibrium for the infinite time horizon). Groups where the price settled down at 2 form a
small minority. Finally, there is a large minority of groups where prices did not converge and
displayed some kind of cyclical behavior. For the groups in the latter category, we pursue a
deeper investigation in the underlying pricing dynamics. In doing so, we neglect premature
decision making in both treatments and endgame effects in the fixed ending treatment by
neglecting the prices set in the first fourteen periods and the last six periods.5
4.1 Random ending
For this treatment we have in total 27 independent observations spread over two sessions. In
the first session, 15 pairs of subjects played for 67 periods. The remaining 12 pairs of subjects
played in the second session which consisted of 40 periods. If subjects’ behavior would be
consistent with common belief in sequential rationality and Markovian behavior, we should
observe one of the two equilibria of Subsection 2.1. That is, prices are constantly 3, or would
follow the rocket–feather pattern of prices gradually falling to 0, where at some point the
price rockets to 5. All decisions made throughout these experimental sessions are presented
in Appendix A.
4See Section C for the instructions and control questions.
5Changing the categories by a couple of periods does not lead to different conclusions.
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Apart from Groups R1.6, R2.5, R2.6, R2.7 and R2.11, subjects managed to coordinate
on a common price. Groups R1.15 and R2.1 settled down at a price of 2. The remaining 20
groups settled down at a price of 3. So, a majority of the groups play according to the focal
price equilibrium. Four of these 20 groups—namely: R1.9, R1.10, R1.13, and R2.9—need
more than 15 periods for getting to this equilibrium. The other 16 groups manage to get to
this equilibrium rather quickly. Next, we study the dynamics of pricing behavior for those
five groups that did not settle down at a single common price in more detail.
One property of a price cycle is that a range of prices is observed. In addition, subjects
should gradually undercut each other’s price until the prices reach a certain bottom level.
Undercutting behavior above the bottom price can be identified by a rather high conditional
probability that pt+1 = pt − 1. When prices have reached the bottom, they are likely to stay
there for some periods due to the coordination problem for bringing prices up. Consequently,
having the mode at the bottom of the price range may indicate some form of cycling behavior.6
For the relevant five groups, Table 3 displays the conditional switching probabilities for the
observations after period 15. For Group R1.6 these probabilities are based on 52 decisions,
and for Groups R2.5, R2.6, R2.7 and R2.11 on 25 decisions each. Each entry in the table
shows the probability that a current price of pt is followed by a price of pt+1 in the subsequent
period. The last row shows the number of observations on which the probabilities are based
for each of the possible current prices.
All five observations share the common property that once a price larger or equal to 4 is
set, it will immediately be undercut. In Group R2.5 a price of 3 is as likely being undercut
as being matched. In the other four out of five observations, also a price of 3 is immediately
undercut. Apart from Group R2.7, prices of 2 and 1 are matched with high probability. These
groups therefore do not display active cyclical behavior as the price often tends to stagnate
at 1 or 2. In these observations prices larger or equal to 3 are not frequently observed. In
Group R2.7, a price of 2 is undercut with certainty. One period later, when the price has
reached the bottom of the price cycle at price 1, in this group, the price is matched with
probability 0.33 and brought up with probability 0.67 in order to continue the process of
gradual undercutting.
The only observation, out of the 27 in total, that comprises the conditions of a price
cycle is Group R2.7. All prices higher than 1 are followed by a price that is one below
it in the subsequent period. After the price has dropped to 1, it either remains there or
it is (substantially) increased. Even though prices do clearly cycle, the behavior does not
completely match the price cycle equilibrium of Maskin and Tirole (1988). Namely, in this
6In empirical studies a negative median price change is sometimes taken as an indication of cycling prices
(see Lewis (2006) and Doyle et al. (2007)). In these studies prices are set on a much finer grid and therefore
hardly ever the same in subsequent periods. For the present experiment this is not a suitable classification
measure since the coordination stage at the bottom of the cycle can take quite long and hence the median price
change will be zero even if prices do cycle. Actually, the median price change equals zero in the backwards
induction equilibrium of the finite horizon setting which clearly consists of price cycles.
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Group R1.6
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0.07 0
3 1 0 0.04 0 0.33
2 0 1 0.81 0 0.33
1 0 0 0.15 0.60 0.17
0 0 0 0 0.33 0.17
# 0 0 1 4 26 15 6
Group R2.5
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
4 0 0.14 0 0
3 1 0.43 0.17 0.20
2 0 0.43 0.67 0.20
1 0 0 0.17 0.60
0 0 0 0 0
# 0 0 1 7 12 5 0
Group R2.6
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0.09 0
3 1 0 0.11 0.09 0
2 0 1 0.78 0 0
1 0 0 0.11 0.82 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
# 0 0 1 3 9 11 1
Group R2.7
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0.11
5 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0.44
3 0 1 0 0 0.11
2 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0.33
0 0 0 0 0 0
# 1 0 5 5 5 9 0
Group R2.11
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0.08
4 0 0 0 0
3 1 0 0 0.08
2 0 1 0.60 0.23
1 0 0 0.40 0.62
0 0 0 0 0
# 0 1 0 1 10 13 0
Table 3: Probability that pt+1 is set conditional on pt after period 14.
equilibrium, prices are brought up to 5 and coordination takes place at a price of 0. A reason
for the coordination to take place at price 1 may be that undercutting to 0 would induce zero
profit for at least two periods, whereas matching at 1 results in a profit of at least 2.5 over
these two periods.
In the other four observations that do not coordinate at a common price, no real cyclical
behavior is observed over the mature periods. In Groups R1.6, R2.5, and R2.6 undercutting
mainly takes place before period 28. Moreover, in these groups and in Group R2.11 prices
fluctuate between 0 and 3 or between 1 and 3 instead of cycling within these intervals.
To summarize, for 20 of the 27 observations, the subjects’ behavior is consistent with
the focal price equilibrium, possibly after some learning. Cyclical behavior is only found
in one observation: Group R2.7. The remaining six observations are difficult to classify as
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being in line with either the focal price equilibrium or the equilibrium involving price cycles.
Among these there are two observations where the price settled at 2. Although this is not an
equilibrium, there is some logic behind prices stabilizing at 2. In comparison with the focal
price equilibrium, the immediate benefit from undercutting the other firm is much lower,
while the resulting per period profit is only a halve lower. Moreover, it would take (at least)
eight periods, to compensate for the immediate loss of inducing a switch to the focal price.
4.2 Fixed ending
For this treatment we have 15 independent observations that are gathered in one single session.
Within this session, subjects interacted in pairs for 80 periods. The only behavior that is
consistent with common belief of rationality results in the cyclical price pattern of Figure 4.
So, unlike for the treatment with random ending, there is no (subgame-perfect) equilibrium
with prices settling down at 3. Nevertheless, in experiments with long time horizons behavior
is often observed to be more in line with an infinite than with a finite horizon until shortly
before the end.7 Hence, in line with the previous subsection, observations with prices constant
at 3 are not unlikely. All decisions made throughout this session are presented in Appendix B.
In ten out of the 15 groups, subjects coordinated on a common price. One of these ten
groups (Group F.13) settled down at a price of 2, the other nine at a price of 3. From the
latter nine, seven of groups managed to coordinate on one price within 10 periods. The other
two groups needed more than 25 periods. In all observations where prices stabilized at some
point, an endgame effect with length of at most three periods is observed. To be precise, in
two observations there is an endgame effect of length one, in five observations of length two,
and in three observations of length three. This signals that subjects seemed to apply the
procedure of backwards induction only when the end of the session was near, and not earlier.
The other five groups (Groups F.2, F.7, F.8, F.9 and F.10) seem to behave more in
line with the notion of common belief in sequential rationality. In order to see how close
these groups matched equilibrium behavior, we study the dynamics of their pricing behavior
in more detail. Table 4 displays for each group the conditional switching probabilities for
the observations after period 15 and before period 74. Each entry in the table shows the
probability that a current price of pt is followed by a price of pt+1 in the subsequent period.
The last row shows the number of observations on which the probabilities are based for each
of the possible current prices.
In Group F.7 the price never got above 3. In the other observations the price quickly declined
towards 3 when it was above it. A price of 3 was undercut with certainty in Groups F.2 and
F.10, and with 0.78 probability in Group F.9. In Groups F.7 and F.8 a price of 3 was matched
with high probability, but this price stability is most prominent in the periods between 15
and 45. In all groups a price of 2 was likely to be followed by a price of 1, although in quite
7See for instance Selten and Stoecker (1986), Engle-Warnick and Slonim (2004), and Normann and Wallace
(2006).
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Group F.2
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0.14
5 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0.07
3 1 1 0 0.18 0.04
2 0 0 1 0.35 0.04
1 0 0 0 0.47 0.71
0 0 0 0 0 0
# 4 0 2 9 17 28 0
Group F.7
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
4 0 0 0
3 0.73 0 0.23
2 0.23 0.25 0
1 0.04 0.75 0.77
0 0 0 0
# 0 0 0 26 8 26 0
Group F.8
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 0
5 0 0 0 0 0.20 0.08 0
4 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0
3 1 1 1 0.78 0 0 1
2 0 0 0 0.19 0.40 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0.40 0.67 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0
# 1 3 1 32 10 12 1
Group F.9
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0.19
5 0.60 0 0 0 0 0.08
4 0 1 0 0 0 0
3 0.40 0 1 0.22 0 0
2 0 0 0 0.78 0 0.08
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.65
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
# 5 6 5 9 9 26 0
Group F.10
pt
pt+1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.17
5 1 0.13 0 0 0.10 0 0.67
4 0 0.88 0 0 0 0 0.17
3 0 0 1 0 0 0.06 0
2 0 0 0 1 0.10 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0.80 0.53 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.35 0
# 2 8 8 9 10 17 6
Table 4: Probability that pt+1 is set conditional on pt after period 14 and before period 75.
some cases the price of 2 was matched. Once the price was 1, with high probability the price
was either matched or (substantially) brought up. In Group F.10 the price frequently further
decreased to 0, before being brought up.
The switching probabilities indicate that the price dynamics in Groups F.2, F.9 and F.10
seem to follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction closely. Also, the mode price being
equal to 1, is in line with the equilibrium prediction. In Groups F.7 and F.8, another kind of
cycle is observed. Prices are rather stable at 3, with only a small probability on an undercut.
At some point, an undercut takes place and is likely to be followed by another undercut.
Next, the price stabilizes at 1, until it is brought up in order to stabilize once more at 3. This
pricing pattern has the structure of the classical price war of alternations between periods of
gentle and periods of severe price competition.
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To summarize, nine of the 15 groups behave according to the focal price equilibrium of the
infinite horizon counterpart. Of the remaining five observations, three observations clearly
display price cycles. The other two show cyclical behavior that is comparable to that of the
classical price war.
5 Discussion
We experimentally analyzed the alternating price setting duopoly of Maskin and Tirole (1988).
When this game is played for an infinite number of periods, two Markov perfect equilibria
coexist; one consisting of a focal price and one consisting of Edgeworth cycles. We find that
the focal price equilibrium emerges in 20 out of 27 observations. Only in a single observation
subjects’ behavior displays price cycles.
We also analyze the alternating price setting game in case the number of periods is fixed.
We find that the subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of prices that cycle. Experimentally,
we still observe the focal price in nine out of 15 observations, even though this is not a
subgame-perfect equilibrium. Of the remaining five observations, three clearly display price
cycles. The other two observations show cyclical behavior that is comparable to that of the
classical price war. Consequently, there is less cooperative behavior in the treatment with
fixed ending than in the treatment with random ending, although it is impossible to validate
this by means of statistical tests.
It has been difficult to find undercutting behavior, and hence price cycles, in the laboratory
so far. Especially for settings with few players there had been no experimental observations
of them. In our experiments we were able to find cycling prices in a dynamic setting with
only two players, although in the majority of the cases the players coordinated on a single
price. The pricing behavior in the latter instances can, however, not be distinguished from
collusive behavior—something that is not unlikely to be found in experiments with just two
players interacting. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the alternating move structure (that
is, short-run price commitments) has the potential to enhance undercutting behavior and
hence to induce price cycles.
Even though it is quite a strong result to find cycling prices for the present setting,
future research is needed to see whether prices cycle more often if some of the settings of
the alternating move game are changed. For instance, the number of players and hence the
number of periods for which prices are committed could be increased. Furthermore, the
addition of exogenous demand shocks would make undercutting in periods of high demand
more profitable and hence could lead to more cycling behavior. Finally, the structure of the
profit table could be altered to make undercutting the focal price more profitable, although
the coexistence of the two equilibria needs to be retained.
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A Treatments with random ending
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Figure 5: Group R1.1
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Figure 6: Group R1.2
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Figure 7: Group R1.3
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Figure 8: Group R1.4
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Figure 9: Group R1.5
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Figure 10: Group R1.6
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Figure 11: Group R1.7
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Figure 12: Group R1.8
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Figure 13: Group R1.9
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Figure 14: Group R1.10
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Figure 15: Group R1.11
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Figure 16: Group R1.12
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Figure 17: Group R1.13
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Figure 18: Group R1.14
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Figure 19: Group R1.15
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Figure 20: Group R2.1
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Figure 21: Group R2.2
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Figure 22: Group R2.3
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Figure 23: Group R2.4
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Figure 24: Group R2.5
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Figure 25: Group R2.6
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Figure 26: Group R2.7
p
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 6
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-
••
•
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
◦
◦
◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Figure 27: Group R2.8
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Figure 28: Group R2.9
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Figure 29: Group R2.10
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Figure 30: Group R2.11
p
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 6
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Period
-
•
•
• • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Figure 31: Group R2.12
B Treatment with fixed ending
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Figure 32: Group F.1
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Figure 33: Group F.2
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Figure 34: Group F.3
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Figure 35: Group F.4
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Figure 36: Group F.5
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Figure 37: Group F.6
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Figure 38: Group F.7
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Figure 39: Group F.8
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Figure 40: Group F.9
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Figure 41: Group F.10
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Figure 42: Group F.11
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Figure 43: Group F.12
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Figure 44: Group F.13
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Figure 45: Group F.14
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Figure 46: Group F.15
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C Instructions
The instructions that students received before the experiment started are given here. In case
the instruction differed for the two treatments, the text for the treatment with random ending
is reported between [ ].
Dear participant,
welcome to this experiment. You will be compensated according to your performance. In
order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an optimal setting, we want to ask you to
follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• Read these instructions carefully! It is important that you understand the rules of this
experiment. These instructions are identical for all subjects that participate together
with you. If something is not explained well, please raise your hand. Do not ask the
question out loud, but wait until one of the experimenters approaches you to answer
the question in private.
• Switch off your mobile phone!
• Do not communicate with your fellow students! Even though the experiment may get
exiting at times, it is very important that you remain silent through the proceedings.
• Focus on your own computer screen and not on other participants!
• There is paper and a pen on your table which you can use during the experiment.
• After the experiment, please remain seated until you are paid off.
• If you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to
exclude you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions and earnings in this experiment will remain anonymous.
General set-up
In this experiment all of you are sellers of a fictitious commodity. You can earn ECU (Exper-
imental Currency Units) which will be exchanged into Euros at the end of the experiment.
The exchange rate will be given in the instructions below.
Before the experiment starts, you will be randomly divided into groups of two sellers. You
will not know the identity of the seller you are matched with. The groups remain unchanged
throughout the whole experiment.
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Procedures
This experiment consists of 80 [multiple] periods. In each period, only one of the two sellers
can adapt its price. The price of the seller that cannot adapt its price remains equal to its
price in the previous period. The seller that can adapt its price switches after each period.
Consequently, one seller can adapt its price only in the odd periods, whereas the other seller
can adapt its price only in the even periods.
Before setting your price for the current and the subsequent period, you observe the price of
the other seller for the current period. Remember that the other seller can adapt its price
in the next period, after having observed your price. This procedure of alternating price-
adaptation continues until the experiment ends.
Possible prices are the integers between (and including) 0 and 6. To decide on a price you
can select a price on your screen and then click on OK (see the figure below).
You can now adapt your price for the current and the next period.
The current price of the other seller is: 2
For the current and the next period, select your price:ddddddd
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
OK
Period
1 out of 80 remaining time [sec]: 28
Total Profit
your total profit so far is ECU 0.0
Figure 1: Screenshot of price adaptation screen.
After the seller that could adapt its price has made its decision, the profits for that period
are determined. Only the seller that has the lowest price sells output. The amount of output
depends on its price. There are no production costs. Hence, the profit for the seller that has
the lowest price is equal to the output multiplied by its price. Table 1 shows the output and
profit at each possible price for the seller that has the lowest price. The other seller has a
profit equal to zero in this period.
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Price 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Output 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Profit 0 5 8 9 8 5 0
Table 1: The output and profit for the seller with the lowest price.
In case both sellers have the same price, output is split equally. The profit for each seller is
then half of the profit reported in Table 1 at that price.
At the end of each period, both sellers receive an overview of the results of that period. You
can observe your price, the price of the other seller, your profit, and your total profit so far.
In a period in which you cannot adapt your price, you only observe the result screen of that
period.
This procedure continues until the end of the experiment.
[ Number of periods
The number of periods in this experiment is unknown until the experiment has ended. After
each period, the experiment ends with a probability of 2 percent. This means that with a
probability of 98 percent the experiment continues with the next period. The decision to
continue or not, is made by a computer. Notice that although you are matched with one
other seller, the number of periods played will be the same for all subjects in the current
session. ]
The first period
Before the procedures above start, it has to be decided who of the sellers is able to adapt its
price in the first (and all odd) periods and to which price this seller responds. Therefore, the
first period contains an initial period in which both sellers are asked to set an initial price.
Next the computer randomly decides which of the two sellers can adapt its price in the odd
periods. In the first period this seller will respond to the other’s initial price.
Closing
After the last period of the experiment, we would like you to complete a short questionnaire
that will appear on your screen. Payments will be made by the experimenters afterwards.
ECU are transformed into Euros according to the following conversion rate: 20 ECU = 1
Euro. In addition to your earnings during the course of the experiment, you will also receive
a show up fee of 5 Euro.
Before we start with the experiment we want you to answer the questionnaire on the next page.
One of the experimenters will go around and check the answers and discuss any problems.
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Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions. When you are finished, raise your hand. One of the
experimenters will come to you and check whether everything is correct.
1. How many sellers are in your group (including yourself)?
2. Suppose that you can adapt your price in period 4. What does this imply for your price
in period 5?
My price in period 5 will be equal to my price in period 4.
My price in period 5 can be any integer between (and including) 0 and 6.
3. Suppose that you can adapt your price in period 4. What do you know about the price
of the other seller in period 5?
The other’s price in period 5 will be equal to its price in period 4.
The other’s price in period 5 can be any integer between (and including) 0 and 6.
4. Suppose that you can adapt your price in period 4. What does this imply for your price
in period 6?
My price in period 6 will be equal to my price in period 4.
My price in period 6 will be equal to my price in period 5.
My price in period 6 can be any integer between (and including) 0 and 6.
5. Suppose you can adapt your price in the current period and the price of the other seller
is 5.
(a) What will be your profit in this period when you set a price of 6?
(b) What will be your profit in this period when you set a price of 5?
(c) What will be your profit in this period when you set a price of 4?
[6. Suppose you are currently in period 17, what is the probability that the experiment
continues with period 18?
]
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